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G. EMLEN HALL*

Steve Reynolds-Portrait of a State
Engineer as a Young Artist
Abstract
Legendary New Mexico water boss Steve Reynolds became State
Engineerin 1955 and died in office in 1990. The following account
attempts to locate him around 1980, at the height of his 35-year
career as head of New Mexico's powerful water agency. After
1980, the world of New Mexico water became even more complex
than the astute Reynolds had made it. In the last decade of his
career,an agingReynolds lost the control that he had imposedfor
a quartercentury on New Mexico's water world One destabilizing
factor was Texas v. New Mexico, an interstate challenge to New
Mexico's compliance with the 1949 PecosRiver Compact. There
were many others-the growth of environmentalism, the
politicization of water, the claims by Native Americans to the
State's most basic resource, the demands and claims of other
surroundingstates-none ofwhich the remarkableReynolds could
either completely contain or fully address. Nevertheless, this
account is partof the annalsof Texas v. New Mexico2 andfocuses
on Reynolds at the point in time when that disastrous law suit, at
leastfrom New Mexico's point of view, was just beginning to heat
up and boil over.
As the Pecos River litigation between Texas and New Mexico
started rolling in the second half of the 1970s, long-time New Mexico State
Engineer Steve Reynolds emerged on the national scene as the model of a
devoted, brilliant, state water bureaucrat. The process culminated in a
front-page May 1980 profile in the Wall StreetJournal. Previous articles in
local publications had fastened on Reynolds and his already long tenure.
For a while it seemed as if every new reporter to New Mexico, and there
were a lot of them in the fast growth seventies and'eighties, felt obliged to

* G. Emlen Hall is a professor of law at the University of New Mexico School of Law
where he writes extensively on the history of New Mexico's natural resources. From 1976 to
1981, Professor Hall worked as a special assistant attorney general with the Legal Division of
the New Mexico State Engineer Office. This essay is part of a longer annal, nearing
completion, of the inter-state battle over the Pecos River, Em Hall, WATER RoCr THE
TEXAS/NEW MExIco STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE PEcos RIVER (forthcoming).
1. See Em Hall, Water-New Mexico's DelicateBalance, N.M. MAGAZINE, May 1983, at 5,
15-22.

2. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 US. 124 (1987).
3. William E. Blundell, Hot Spot: In New Mexico, Water is a Valuable Resource-andso is
Water Boss, Wail 3t. J., May 1,1980, at 1.
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profile Reynolds. Subsequent publications as diverse as the Albuquerque
Journal's short-lived weekly newsmagazine and Washington, D.C.'s
Governing magazine featured Reynolds, too, although they tended to be
more moderate in their praise and more balanced in their views.4 But it was
the Wall Street Journal story that really catapulted Reynolds out of the
world of western water and onto a national arena.
All of these newspaper profiles focused on the same Reynolds
facets that the Wall Street Journalexplored. In Reynolds the Journal found
an dmigrk to New Mexico who, like more than half of its residents by the
1980s, had been bom elsewhere. All the articles re-told the story of
Reynolds coming to New Mexico from Decatur, Illinois, in 1935 as a
Depression-driven, hungry young college student bound by what looked
like chance but what turned out to be fate. It was all the more fitting,
thought the Wall Street Journal,that Reynolds looked as if he'd always been
here. He was, reported the Journalin 1980, "a tall, rangy 63-year-old who
looks more like a rancher than a bureaucrat.'
The articles went on to relate Reynolds' successes at the University
of New Mexico (UNM): as a student (Reynolds graduated first in the 1939
class as an engineering student, an unheard of match of academic major
and success), as an athlete (Reynolds played end on the UNM football
team), and as a politician (Reynolds was president of his class in 1938 and
1939). Here in Reynolds, the articles all implied, was a huge success just
waiting to happen.
Success occurred when Governor John Simms, a fellow UNM
graduate, selected Reynolds as State Engineer in August of 1955, a position
Reynolds would hold until his death in 1990. "He's the State Engineer of
New Mexico," reported the Journalin 1980, "a title that doesn't describe his
real job-water boss of a state with some of the strongest laws and best
enforcement in the arid West, where water is the resource on which all
others depend. In deciding who gets how much of a limited supply, the
engineer has impartially enraged farmers, oilmen, miners and whole cities.
Yet even his opponents respect him, and over the years the unflappable Mr.
Reynolds has become something of a resource himself."" This implicit
combination of science and power and public control fascinated all of
Reynolds' fans.
The fact that Reynolds had risen to power and had held it for a
long time even by 1980 was equally fascinating to the Wall Street Journal

4. See Tom Arrandale, New Mexico's Water Czar, GOVERNING, June 1989, at 49. See also
Kate McGraw, Steve Reynolds is Nobody's Sweetheart, SANTA FE NEw MExIcAN, Nov. 10,1980,

at B-1; Nolan Hester, The Water Boss, IMPACT, May 5,1987, at 4.
5.
6.

Blundell, supranote 3, at 1.
See id.
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and others. Working closely with New Mexico's Congressional delegation,
particularly New Mexico Senator Clinton Anderson and his Senate
Committee on Interior Affairs, and with the Bureau of Reclamation,
Reynolds had built enduring and powerful relationships with Federal
officials in Washington who controlled the money for western water
projects The Journal noted these long-standing relationships, quoted a
couple of prominent Washington officials and went on to Reynolds' even
more amazing long-time survival in New Mexico state politics.
To outsiders and journalists new to New Mexico, political life here
seemed nasty, brutish and very short. The state capitol, Santa Fe, in
particular looked like a place where political ambitions quickly died. The
very part-time, formally unpaid State Legislature appeared the last place
where a water bureaucrat and engineer could survive. Governors came
and went, usually nowhere, and had the power to appoint the state water
boss to a short two-year term. Yet Steve Reynolds survived, session after
session, year after year, governor after governor." When asked how by the
journalists, state politicians always cited Reynolds even-handed
administration of the state's intricate and arcane water laws. The journalists
always trotted out the shop-worn story about Reynolds' cancellation of a
former governor's well permit for failure to abide by its strict terms to
show that Reynolds survived in state politics by refusing to play it.
Yet, beneath the surface of this portrait of State Engineer as water
saint, there lurked a much more complex character. For example, there was
talk in 1980 and thereafter that the Wall Street Journalprofile had actually
been arranged by a former Reynolds employee at the head of the legal
division of the Department of Energy in Washington as a way of shoring
up Reynolds' plummeting stock in New Mexico.9 Indeed, as it turned out,
there was calculation in all things that State Engineer Steve Reynolds did,
including everyone's denial in profile after profile that he made any
political calculations in his administration of New Mexico's water law.
So astute observers took note in May 1976 when Special Master
Jean Breitenstein, appointed by the United States Supreme Court to hear
Texas v. New Mexico, arranged to inspect by air the Pecos River. Delegations

7. SeeHELEN INGRAM, WATER PouIcs: CONTINUrY AND CHANGE (1990). See also MARc
P. REtSNER, CADILLAC DESERT. THE AMEUcAN WEr AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986)

(description and criticism of this "iron triangle of western water"); DONALD WO'FrEP, RVERS
OF EMPIRE: WATER AMD=Y AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
8. For an academic discussion of the nature of New Mexican politics, see F. Chris
Garcia, New Mexico Politicsand Government, in CoIwdPORARY N.W MEXIco, 1940-1990, at 25
(Richard W. Etulain, ed., 1994).
9. See McGraw, supra note 4; Hall, supm note 1; Interview with Paul Bloom, N.M. Special
Assistant Att'y Gen., in Santa Fe, N. M. (Dec. 9, 1992) (tapes and transcripts on file with
author).
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from the two states took off with him in a small New Mexico State

Corporation Commission airplane on the reconnaissance trip and State
Engineer Reynolds did not come along." He wasn't averse to flying. For
years he had flown at the front of B-17s and B-29s doing research into
summer cloud formation, lightning and rain.1 Instead, two other factors
had indicated to Reynolds and his principal advisor, the lawyer Paul
Bloom, that Reynolds shouldn't come along.
First, State Engineer Reynolds had decided that he himself would
both direct New Mexico's defense against the Texas suit over the Pecos
River and that he would be the State's principal witness. As State Engineer
since 1955, Reynolds served as ex offtio secretary of the parallel New
Mexico Interstate Stream Commission. In turn, that position made him de
facto representative to the Pecos River Commission. He was as familiar as
anyone was with inter-state problems on the River. But when some of his
advisers had pleaded with him to find some less partisan representative for
New Mexico's interests in the Pecos River, Reynolds had rejected the idea.'
A Texas claim to the New Mexico Pecos River Steve Reynolds would
handle himself.
In a sense this Pecos River decision represented both the strengths
and weaknesses of Steve Reynolds' water administration as it had
developed in the 20 years between 1955 and 1980. It was true that he did
know more himself about the Pecos River than anyone else anywhere,
except perhaps his trusted lieutenant, Carl Slingerland, just as he knew
more about all New Mexico water issues. The depth and breadth of his
Pecos River knowledge certainly qualified him to speak on the issues. But
over the years, his voice had become the only voice that could be heard
above the growing grumbling and eventual din of the Pecos River battle.
Now, as the din became a lawsuit, Reynolds decided that he alone would
speak, in court and not on an airplane, about Texas' claim to the River. For
twenty years, Reynolds had convinced New Mexicans that he would take
care of their water problems and they had let him.' Now in 1976, as a kind
of last hurrah, he would take care of the Pecos, too, as legal strategist, as
principle witness, but not, alas, as a passenger on the trip to acquaint
newcomers to a River whose problems he already knew so well.

10. See Michael Rodak, Notice of Appointment and Reference, Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124 (1987) ( Nov. 11, 1975, on file at the State Engineer Office, File 225GC2, Santa Fe,
N.M.).
11. See JOE CHEW, STORMS ABOVE THE DEsErr ATmosminuc RESEARCH INNEW Mxico
1935-1985, at 42-48 (1985). Cf. Byron Spice, N.M. Tech PhysicistInvolved in Shuttle's Lightning
Search, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 3,1985, at B-1.
12. See Bloom, supranote 9.
13. See Ira Clark, What Authority Should Reside in the State Engineer? New Mexico as a Case
Study, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J.467 (1992).
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The other reason that Steve Reynolds elected not to tour the Pecos
River in spring of 1976 was that he was still mending political fences of his
own in Santa Fe. In November 1974 New Mexico had elected Las Cruces
politician and small-time businessman Jerry Apodaca as governor. A
smart, vindictive veteran of New Mexico politics, Apodaca had pledged to
Hispanic constituents that he would consider appointing someone as State
Engineer who was more sympathetic than Reynolds had been to the special
water problems of small New Mexico farmers and to the special claims of
at least one powerful Apodaca ally.1'
Apodaca later admitted to the Wall Street Journal that he had
considered replacing Reynolds. "We took a long hard look at his
operation," Apodaca told the Journal. "He'd been there for so long he
practically had a monopoly on water policy; it was like Hoover at the FBI.
But we could find no vindictiveness, no personal involvement in any of his
decisions. And he knew everything about water; that knowledge is Steve's
great security."' As a result, implied Apodaca, he re-appointed Reynolds
to what was then Reynolds's tenth consecutive two-year term.
In fact, the story of Apodaca's re-appointment of Reynolds as state
engineer in 1975 was more complex than either admitted and showed the
balance of water politics and policy under Reynolds on the eve of the Texas
suit against New Mexico over the Pecos River. As soon as Apodaca won
the November 1974 general election and began trying to find a replacement
for Reynolds as state engineer, Reynolds started to fight back through his
lieutenants and allies. Reynolds was too much a gentleman to enter the
trenches of New Mexico politics directly. Instead, he allowed his chief allies
and subordinates to do the dirty work for him.
In December 1974 and January 1975, State Engineer general counsel
Paul Bloom and former governor Jack Campbell began a quiet telephone
campaign on Reynolds' behalf. The two called bankers and realtors and
large mining companies across the state, telling them of Apodaca's plans
to get rid of Reynolds and inviting them to urge the new governor not to
do this. The Reynolds allies even went so far as to specifically target the
numerous bank officers in charge of loans to an over-extended Apodaca
and his businesses. These big business interests weighed in on Reynolds'
side and Apodaca caved in.'6 If anything, Reynolds' victory was more a
product of Reynolds exploiting Apodaca's weaknesses rather than

14. See Bloom, supra note 9. State Representative Ben Luqan from Nambe had complained
bitterly about Reynolds' role in forfeiting for non-use ancient irrigation rights in northern
New Mexico. The powerful Albuquerque lawyer, William Marchiondo, represented his
Roswell-area in-laws in a losing battle to increase the Moutray's water rights there.
15. Blundell, supra note 3, at 37.
16. See Bloom, supranote 9.
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Apodaca's recognition of Reynolds' strength, as the ex-governor told the
Wall Street Journal in 1980.
Reynolds was able to rally New Mexico's biggest and most
conservative institutions to his side in 1975 because over the twenty years
of his service as state engineer he had convinced them that his hard-boiled
regulation of New Mexico water best served the economic development
interests of the state. Reynolds brought stability to the world of New
Mexico water;17 New Mexico powers were for that. This was a far cry from
where Reynolds had begun as state engineer in August of 1955.
Almost as soon as he was appointed State Engineer, Reynolds
asserted the state's jurisdiction over ground water in most of the Rio
Grande Valley from the Colorado state line to the Elephant Butte reservoir
in southern New Mexico. Reynolds proposed to recognize that ground
water and surface water in the Rio Grande basin came from the same
natural source so that, for example, taking water from wells in the basin
was bound to diminish the water flowing in the river.1
In 1956 the recognition of the inter-relationship of ground water
and surface water and the resulting "conjunctive management" of the two
water sources shot New Mexico, once again, way in front of every other
western state in terms of progressive water management. 9 In the 1930s and
in the Pecos River basin, New Mexico had taken the first step among
western states by declaring ground water subject to public regulation, just
like surface water." Now in the mid 1950s, with Reynolds leading the way,
New Mexico took the second giant step, this time in the Rio Grande basin,
by recognizing that the two public sources of water were in fact one.
That recognition had radical implications for real estate
development in the middle Rio Grande basin, particularly around

17. See 136 CONG. RBC. S5357-02 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pete
Domenici, The Passingof Steve Reynolds). See also Editorial, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 26,1990;
Editorial, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 27,1990 (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici, The Passing
of Steve Reynolits).
18. See Order Declaring Rio Grande Underground Water, N.M. State Engineer Office
(Nov. 29,1956); Memorandum on Declaration of the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin
N.M.State Engineer Office (Nov. 29,1956); Findings and Order and Memorandum Decision
In the Matter of the Applications to Appropriate Underground Waters of the Rio Grande
Basin, City of Albuquerque, Applicant, Bemalillo-Sandoval County Farm and Livestock
Bureau Protestants, Application Nos. RG-960, RG-961, RG-962, RG-963, Before the State
Engineer of N.M. (Nov. 4,1957).
19. See F. Harlan Flint, Ground Water Administration:A New Mexico Viewpoint, 14 ROCKY
MTN.MN. L Inr. 551 (1968). Flint was long-time Chief Counsel to State Engineer Reynolds.
20. See Yeo v. Tweedy, 286 P. 970 (1929) (declaring the regulation of underground waters
in N.M. to be constitutional and not subversive of vested rights of overlying land owners);
1931 NM Laws, Ch.131. See generally ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEw RGHTS N WESTERN
WATERS 162-72 (1983).
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Albuquerque. In the 1950s the city was perched on the edge of a growth
spurt previously unheard of in New Mexico. Real estate promoters and
politicians touted Albuquerque as sitting on top of a bottomless ocean of
underground water, free for the taking from deep city wells drilled helter
skelter into the mesas east of the city and the river. Now here came the
brash new State Engineer, Steve Reynolds, who proposed putting a damper
on the vision of limitless water, which was at the bottom of the boosters'
hopes for unlimited growth. If the proposed Reynolds policy stood, not
only would the developers have to deal with the State for public ground
water, they would also have to purchase ancient surface water rights near
the river to offset the effects on the river of pumping the ground water on
the mesas. Suddenly, the limitless supply that the developers and city
officials had counted21on evaporated. Real estate costs would go up and
profit margins down.
Reynolds himself loved to tell the story of his announcement of
his proposed Rio Grande basin plan. Called by the Chamber of Commerce
in Albuquerque to account for his water policy in early 1957, the brash,
new State Engineer found himself in a huge, oak-wainscoted board
meeting room with every New Mexico big-shot banker and mogul seated
around a long, narrow conference table. Reynolds had been invited to
explain his plan for conjunctive management of the water resources in the
middle Rio Grande basin. As the audience realized the implications of what
State Engineer Reynolds was telling them, they became, related Reynolds,
grinning, more and more hostile. By the end of the meeting, the angry
audience, led by then Albuquerque city commissioner Maurice Sanchez,
pledged to fight him tooth and nail in the courts and in the legislature.?
The two battlegrounds turned out to be Reynolds' favorites. Later,
affectionately called by a Supreme Court justice "the most litigious son-ofa-bitch in New Mexico," 24Reynolds often turned to the courts to vindicate
policies that couldn't win immediate political approval. By 1962 he and his
lawyers had beaten the challenge of the city of Albuquerque to his

21. See Memorandum Decision In the Matter of the Applications to Appropriate
Underground Waters of the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, City of Albuqtierque,
Applicant, N.M. State Engineer Office (Nov. 4,1957).
22. Reynolds related the story in private frequently, especially at Saturday morning
coffees in Santa Fe with his legal staff. He told the story publicly in more muted terms. See,
e.g., Steve Reynolds, Presentation at Univ. of N.M. School of Law to the Water Resources

Management Program (May 1988).
23. See Wayne S. Scott, UndergroundWater District Draws Fire,ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Jan. 4,
1957, at 1.

24. Blundell, supra note 3, at 1.
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proposed policy and had found an ally in the judiciary that he would use
to advantage over the next twenty years.75
As for the battle in the legislature, the struggle was a little more
complex. The city of Albuquerque was powerful even then. The City rallied
the same conservative rural-dominated membership that saved Reynolds
in 1975 behind its call in 1957 to clip the wings of an oppressive State
Engineer. City Commissioner Maurice Sanchez proposed to do so by
requiring district court approval of ground water basins of the kind that
Reynolds unilaterally had imposed.' Reynolds fought the bill in the
legislature in a way that would characterize his relationship with that body
for the next twenty years. He banished his staff from any contact with the
legislature; he alone would speak for the state's professional water policy
and make whatever legislative deals needed to be made. He wrote long
memos to everyone on every water-related topic.' He sat patiently in the
back of committee hearing rooms, waiting hour after hour to offer
testimony, answer questions and direct policy. Usually a cantankerous
state legislature took his advice.
However, this early City of Albuquerque/ground water battle
Reynolds initially lost. On March 7,1957, the State Senate rejected, on a 17
to 15 vote, the City-sponsored bill putting ground water power directly in
the hands of the courts. Two days later, the Senate reversed itself when
Lieutenant Governor Joseph Montoya broke a 16-16 tie by voting in favor
of the bill.2 Fortunately, new governor Edwin Mechem, a politician
Reynolds described as genuinely interested in water affairs, vetoed the
bill." Reynolds' power to take control over ground water when he wanted
to and for hydrological reasons was established and saved--just.
But what a change in attitudes and backers in the twenty years
between the Albuquerque battle that started in 1955 and the Apodaca one
in 1975. In the earlier one, the bankers and real estate developers and big
farmers fought to clip Reynolds' seizure of control of ground water, the last
unregulated water resource available for the taking in a burgeoning New
Mexico. In the later battle in 1975, the same institutions that had tried to get

25. See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (1962) (state engineer may impose
suitable conditions on water permit applicant so as to not impair rights of prior
appropriators).
26. See H.B.198, 23rd Leg. (NM. 1957) (An Act Relating to Underground Water).
27. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steve Reynolds, State Engineer, to State Sen. T.E. Lusk
(Mar. 4,1957) (in regard to H.B. 198); Memorandum from Steve Reynolds to State Sen. Tibo
J.Chavez (Mar. 5,1957) (in regard to H.B. 198) (on file with the Interstate Stream Commission,
Santa Fe, N.M.).
28. See Official Senate Roll Call, H.B. 198,23rd Leg. (N.M. Mar. 7,9,1957).
29. See Interview with Hon. Edwin L. Mechem, New Mexico Oral History Project, Univ.
of N.M. School of Law (Mar. 9,1997).
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rid of him now saved him. In the interim, Reynolds had won the support
of the New Mexico powers-that-be by convincing them that his aggressive
form of water management actually stabilized water resources and
guaranteed more reliable investments of the kind that promised to make
them rich.
Reynolds accomplished that switch between 1955 and 1975 in
several ways. First, he demonstrated time and again his almost obsessive
devotion to New Mexico and her water interests. "When it comes to
water," remarked Paul Bloom, for years Reynolds' chief lawyer, "he's like
a Bedouin potentate. It's me against my brother and my brother and me
against the clan and the clan against all the other clans in the world."
As New Mexico clan leader, Reynolds' ability to exact favorable
treatment in inter-state water affairs was legendary. New Mexico, for
example, would support a huge, controversial Arizona water project only
if Arizona would support a New Mexico claim to the Gila River that was
larger than any court or legislature had recognized and a dam to go along
with it. Reynolds made the outrageous demand stick. When Arizona
complained that Reynolds was blackmailing Arizona, Reynolds replied
with characteristic insouciance, "Well, if that enables you to understand
our position, you can call it blackmail."31
By whatever name, Reynolds accomplished his success by forging
powerful and enduring political alliances. He and long-time United States
senator from New Mexico, Clinton Anderson, teamed up as a powerful
influence on federal water policy in the west in general, and New Mexico
in particular.32 Within New Mexico, Reynolds paired himself with the
conservative, smart, long-standing state senator from Deming, Ike
Smalley.' Together they held their own in the annual legislative sessions
in Santa Fe.
Reynolds offered these politicians a scientific justification for the
water policies that they pursued. No one labored as hard as Steve Reynolds
did to master the available technical data about New Mexico water. He
worked six or even seven days a week, at home or in his office, and did
almost nothing else. For recreation, the former intercollegiate football
player sailed a small boat, alone, on one of the lakes that his controversial
dams produced.' He read everything that had anything to do with New
Mexico water, and almost nothing else. When an intimate colleague gave

30. Bloom, supranote 9.
31. Hester, supra note 4, at 8. See also IRA G. CLARK, WATER INNEW MEXcO 520-21 (1987);
Helen Ingram, Water Politics:Continuity and Change,31 NAT. RESOURCES J.703 (1991).
32. See REISNER, supranote 7, at 143,282.
33. See Mechem, supra note 29.
34. See Interview with Richard Simms, General Counsel, N.M. State Engineer Office, in
Santa Fe, N.M. (Dec. 4,1992).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 38

him a Franz Kafka parable on Poseidon because he believed that Reynolds
might be interested in the story of an ancient water king, Reynolds
laughed, asked who Kafka and Poseidon were, and then filed the parable
without reading it.'
Yet what he had mastered, and it dealt mostly with New Mexico
water, he mastered so completely that he could explain it in a web of
history and numbers and policy so seamless that his analysis carried the
weight of eternal scientific truth. New Mexico governor after governor
cited State Engineer Reynolds' knowledge as the principal source of his
extraordinary power and longevity.' Frequent New Mexico governor
Edwin Mechem, one of Reynolds' true admirers, expressed the same
respect acerbically when he remarked that "Steve's greatest source of
power was that he always managed to get in the first word."'
These words Reynolds sometimes expressed on his feet. He was
a courteous, dignified speaker who, especially late in his career, tended to
read too much from texts prepared many years before.' But in public

appearances Reynolds' saving grace was a charming and usually selfdeprecating sense of humor. After graduating from UNM in 1939, he
returned as an adjunct professor and assistant football coach in the 1940s.
Three-time governor Bruce King played under him as a student and then
as governor re-appointed Reynolds as often to the State Engineer's office.
"I began as the governor's coach," Reynolds loved to say, "and I ended up
as his water boy.""
At other times, that ready verbal wit could acquire an edge.
Trapped before a hostile Hispanic audience in Espaflola one evening,
Reynolds was asked why he didn't speak Spanish. "I'm sorry I never
learned," he replied. "I should have. But I never did because
the Hispanic
"4
people of New Mexico were too polite to insist on it. 0
As good as he was on his feet, Reynolds was really at his best, and
felt most comfortable, trying to accurately express his ideas in writing. The
real legacy of State Engineer Steve Reynolds lies in the written memoranda
that he prepared and the written briefs his lawyers prepared with constant
editorial help (some called it interference) from Reynolds.

35. See Bloom, supra note 9.
36. See Blundell, supra note 3 (Gov. Apodaca); Tom Arrandale, Time is Running Outfor
One of the Last of the Great -Water Buffalos," GOVERNING, June 1989, at 46, 50 (Gov. Carruthers).
37. Mechem, supra note 29.
38. See, e.g., Public Speeches of S. E Reynolds, 1955-1990 (on file at State Engineer Office,
Santa Fe, N.M.).
39. Steve Reynolds, Presentation at Univ. of N. School of Law to the Water Resources
Management Program (May 1988) (videotape).
40. See Simms, supra note 34.
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Reynolds wrote like the engineer he was. His prose wasn't
particularly lively. It was full of the kinds of passive constructions that
engineers and scientists love and that, for most other readers, kill sentences
in mid-flight. But a Reynolds document was built on a careful, accurate
expression that he insisted on. High-level aides and lawyers would quake
at the prospect of being called into Reynolds' office to go over a proposed
document with him4
He'd be waiting at the large conference desk in his elegant comer
office in the Bataan Memorial building with what he called his "editorial
tools," a library-sized Webster's International dictionary and a pencil which
had erasers mounted on both ends. The double-ended pencil had been
given to him by aides whose prose had suffered at the hands of Reynolds'
acute sense of diction and syntax. If the aides complained too much about
Reynolds' linguistic sensitivity, Reynolds would stop erasing, lay the pencil
down and, with a grin, announce, "Well, I guess that we could just tear the
whole thing up and start over again from scratch." The author and editor
would quickly return to the text. "Let's see," they'd remember Reynolds
saying, "I think this sentence needs a preposition in here."
From all this tinkering and editing there emerged from Reynolds'
office endless briefs for courts and memoranda for the State Legislature.Y
Like good legal briefs, the legislative memoranda appeared neutral on the
surface but were in fact expressed and organized and structured in such a
way as to lead inevitably to a conclusion that appeared self-evident but
wasn't. Implicitly they expressed a remarkably consistent view of New
Mexico water that included his views on the Pecos River.
That underlying Reynolds view was fundamentally based on an
instrumental view of nature in general and water in particular. Natural
processes were good in his view only by virtue of what they could do for
man. Water that was left in a stream helped no one and water that was left
in the ground remained hidden. Steve Reynolds fought the increasingly
popular notion that water in rivers-"instream flows"-deserved legal
protection because he believed so fundamentally that the operative term in

"beneficial use" was "use."
Reynolds combined that belief in the use of water with an
engineer's skeptical view of theories, be they scientific or legal, that
attempted to explain more than they could. Trained as a mechanical
engineer, Reynolds understood the basic formulas common to the

41. See Hester, supra note 4, at 6.
42.

The Reynolds papers [hereinafter Reynolds Papers] are housed in various rooms and

different file cabinets in the State Engineer Office and the Interstate Stream Commission,
Santa Fe. In the early 1990's, Martha Dabney, lawyer, State Engineer Office, made a
preliminary and incomplete assessment of the Reynolds Papers.
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movement of both matter and energy through both porous and non-porous
material, whether the matter was electricity moving through wires, heat
through tubes, or ground water through underground geological
structures.' But, especially when it came to the complex and poorly
understood movement of groundwater, Reynolds maintained a healthy
skepticism that the theories adequately could predict what would happen
in the actual world. Reynolds preferred to wait and see.
While waiting for the scientific facts to catch up with the scientific
theories, Reynolds played what cards were available to him to protect his
and New Mexico's options. Nature itself held a critical card and Reynolds
insisted on recognizing the fact that New Mexico was a desert. Limited
water was distributed unevenly. "You had to play Nature's water cards,"
he loved to say, "the way that Jesus flung 'em." New Mexico was a desert
and no massive importation of supplies from the Columbia River to the
west or the Mississippi to the east would change that." If God gave the
people of Roswell that amazing ground water aquifer, then it was theirs to
enjoy. No card he held could trump Roswell's ace-in-the hole, the bounty
that Nature had bestowed. However, Reynolds did hold some powerful
cards and one of the principle cards he held and played very well was the
legal King.
The courts, as well as the legislature, came to trust his judgment
and did, by and large, what he asked. Reynolds had almost become a
lawyer himself.' He joked about practicing law without a license. He liked
the company of lawyers, with all their verbal jousting. In turn, the lawyers
recognized Reynolds as a skillful and fair judge in hotly contested
administrative water disputes." But, insisted Reynolds' closest legal allies,
he had the engineer's deep suspicion that lawyers were really just
pettifoggers who wasted a lot of time and produced nothing real and that
laws were there to be manipulated for other ends.47 Reynolds recognized,
as he often said himself, that water in New Mexico was "extensively and

43. New Mexican C. V. Theis, working out of a U.S. Geological Service office housed at
the University of New Mexico at the time Reynolds was there as a student, pioneered the
application of mathematical formulas to predicting, first, well drawdowns, starting in 1935,
and then well draw-down effects on inter-related surface water, starting in 1941. See C. V.
Theis, The Effect ofa Well on the Flow ofa Nearby Stream,Ameican Geophysical Union Transactions
(1941), reprinted in U.S.G.S. GROUND WATER NOTES No.14, at 734 (1953).
44. See REJSNER, supra note 7,443-56.
45. See Arrandale, supra note 36, at 48. Reynolds' wife, Jane Iden, was the daughter of one
of New Mexico's premier lawyers. He had offered to send Reynolds to law school soon after
the two were married.
46. See Tom Arrandale, supra note 36, at 46.,
47. See Bloom, supranote 9.
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intricately governed by law."' But that recognition didn't so much
constrain him as it did create esoteric opportunities for achieving very
different, but very basic, ends.
Basic twentieth century New Mexico water law was built on two
bedrock principles, beneficial use and priority of appropriation. The first
principle of beneficial use insisted that public water be carefully used so
that the limited public supply would stretch as far as it could. The second
principle of priority of appropriation insisted that when beneficially used
water became short, as it inevitably would in a desert environment like
New Mexico, the oldest established users would get their full supply before
the younger users would get any. Both principles were equally embedded
in the New Mexico State Constitution of 1912. 49 But State Engineer Steve
Reynolds believed in the first principle and disliked the second so much
that he disregarded it.
Priority of appropriation struck Reynolds as a silly way of
apportioning short supplies in New Mexico for a number of reasons. First,
he disliked the principle because it offered the law's most basic protection
to New Mexico's oldest and most inefficient uses. Reynolds could, and did,
try to facilitate the market transfer of old rights to new uses so that, as he
liked to say, "water would flow uphill to money." But still, priority of
appropriation faced backwards when New Mexico, under Reynolds, was
trying to use its water policy to move economically forward and it was the
wrong orientation. 4
Reynolds also recognized that in the new world of inter-connected
ground water and surface water, priority enforcement was physically too
slow to work. Calling priorities might have worked where it was invented:
on the small California streams used for mining, where turning off a junior
right meant more water for senior downstream users almost immediately.51
But when a junior well was shut off because a senior downstream surface
user wasn't getting enough water in an inter-connected system, well, that
drastic act didn't do anybody any good. The junior well user couldn't use

48. See S.E. Reynolds, Statementbefore the Water Usage and Water Resources Committee of the
New Mexico Legislature(June 3,1983) (transcriptavailable in Reynolds Papers, supra note 42.);
S.E. Reynolds, Statement Before the Committee on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and
Extractive Industries of the New Mexico Legislature (Sept. 9, 1988) (transcript available in
Reynolds Papers, supra note 42). The two statements, separated by five years, begin in exactly

the same way: "The use of water in New Mexico is extensively and intricately governed by
law."

49. N.M. Co sr. art. XVI, § 2 (water belongs to the public and is subject to appropriation
for beneficial use; priority gives the better right); N.M CoNsr. art. XVI, § 3 (beneficial use shall
be the basis, the measure and the limit).
50. See Bloom, supranote 9; Simms,supra note 34.

51.

See DoNAtDJ. PsANL TOREcLgMA DIEVDWsr. WATw, LAw, AND PuBuc PoucY,

1848-1912, at 11-12,32-35 (1992).
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his well. In the meantime, it could take a long, long time-months, years,
even decades-for the water not used by the well to reach the senior,
surface water irrigator's point of diversion in the stream.' By then the
surface water irrigator had either dried up and blown away or it had
rained.
Reynolds finally believed that enforcement of priorities would take
the power to distribute water and mold policy out of his office and put it
in the hands of the courts.' Far better, thought Reynolds, to use the real
tools of science in the hands of knowledgeable experts, rather than the
crude club of priority in the hands of less sophisticated courts, to manage
New Mexico's scarce resources.'6
The real tools of science Reynolds poured into the State
constitution's command that "beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit" of the right to use water. For most of Reynolds' regime as
State Engineer, "conservation of water" meant one thing, dams, and
"beneficial use" meant another, using as little water as possible to achieve
any desirable end. By insisting that all water rights holders use no more
water than they had to, Reynolds hoped to save enough water to avoid
having to use priorities to apportion the limited supply.
In the meantime, while tightening down on uses within New
Mexico, Reynolds hoped to hold at bay other states with shared interests
in New Mexico's waters. From the outset of his regime in August 1955,
New Mexico was already a party to seven different inter-state agreements
that apportioned common water sources between New Mexico and every
surrounding state.'6 Reynolds recognized that these compacts bound New
Mexico, but from the outset he fought hard and successfully to minimize
the limitations they imposed on his own hard-boiled water rights
administration..
Early in his regime, he had succeeded in controlling the efforts of
neighboring states to use existing inter-state Compacts to limit New
Mexico's power to regulate the use of water within its own boundaries. In

52. See Steve Reynolds, Pews River System Administration (July 12, 1976) in Reynolds

Papers, supra note 42; Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservation District, 332 P.2d 465
(1958); Transcript of Hearing at 57-58, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65)
(Reynolds testimony May 20,1986).
53. See Bloom, supranote 9.
54. Later governors felt that Reynolds had not "managed" New Mexico waters actively
enough. By that they meant that he hadn't made explicit value choices among the various uses
of water. Instead he preferred to facilitate the movement of water between competing uses,
using market mechanisms. See Arrandale, supra note 36, at 48-50.
55. See CLARK, supranote 31, at 500-50.
56.

See Steve Reynolds, Summary-The Effects of InterstateStream Compacts on New Mexico

Water Supp/y (Mar. 22,1956) in Reynolds Papers, supranote 42; Steve Reynolds, New Mexico's
InterstateCompacts (Aug. 1959) in Reynolds Papers, supra note 42.
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early February 1957 the United States Supreme Court threw Texas out of
court in its effort to sue New Mexico over the 1938 Rio Grande Compact.
The Supreme Court ruled that the United States itself was an
"indispensable" party to any attempt to enforce the inter-state Rio Grande
compact.' New Mexico, partially under Reynolds' direction, had both
argued that the suit couldn't proceed without the United States and
convinced the United States not to join in. As a result, Texas couldn't even
get its Rio Grande Compact complaint into court. Less than a decade later
when Texas and New Mexico joined forces against upstream Colorado,
Reynolds succeeded in getting the United States to enter a new Rio Grande
Compact suit.r' From the Texas perspective, it looked as if Reynolds
controlled access to the courts as well as access to New Mexico water.
State Engineer Steve Reynolds brought all of these fundamental
tenets to bear on the Pecos River situation that he inherited in 1955. He
regarded the Compact's Article Ill apportionment provision-"New
Mexico shall not deplete by man's activities the flow of the Pecos River at
the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to Texas
a quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947
condition"S---as hopelessly vague and technically impossible. When he
sought the advice of previous State Engineers John Bliss and John Erickson,
they both told him that despite the Compact's technical complexities
everyone understood that the Compact recognized and protected New
Mexico surface and ground water uses established as of the end of 1947.1
The Pecos River Compact of 1948 he could do nothing about, but the Pecos
River Compact Commission he could try to control Between 1956 and 1961
State Engineer Reynolds moved on every front to shore up New Mexico's
Pecos River compact position.
As secretary of the Interstate Stream Commission by virtue of his
State Engineer position, Reynolds was bound to be dose to the Pecos River
Commission whose New Mexico representative he effectively appointed.6 1
In addition, Reynolds formally served as a member of the Commission's

57. See Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (No. 9).
58. Texas v. State of Colorado, 391 U.S. 901 (1968) (No. 29, granting motion of the United
States to intervene in the new Rio Grande Compact suit). Acting alone, Texas had been unable
to force New Mexico into court. Acting with New Mexico, Texas had been able to force
Colorado into Court. Texans attributed the opposite results to the legal acuity of Steve
Reynolds. His success contributed to the Texas belief that Texas would never get anywhere
in court with New Mexico over the Pecos River. See Bloom, supra note 9.
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19 art. Me(a).
60. See Depositions of former New Mexico State Engineers John Bliss and John Erickson,
(Nov. 22,1976), Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65) (on file with N.M. State
Engineer Office, SEO No. 2255GD2, Santa Fe, N.M.).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-1 (1978).
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critical Engineering Advisory Committee (EAC). Year after year between
1956 and 1976 Reynolds was re-appointed as State Engineer and thus, year
after year, returned to the Pecos River commission and the EAC. To the job,
Reynolds brought the same single-minded devotion to New Mexico and
the same complete mastery of technical and legal detail that he brought to
all of his water work. But it was nowhere so apparent as in the first five
years of Reynolds' involvement with the Pecos River Commission between
1956 and 1961.
In his own inimitable style, the brash new State Engineer Reynolds
started shaking up the Pecos River Commission soon after he attended his
first meeting of the Compact Commission's Engineering Advisory
Committee in October 1955.Q From the outset, Reynolds' relationship with
Royce Tipton, the father of the Compact and now the chairman of the EAC,
was "rocky. " 's At that first meeting Reynolds challenged the validity of
three of the factors used to calculate both the Tipton-inspired "1947
condition" standard and subsequent compliance with it."
Reynolds' challenges came at a particularly sensitive time in the
early history of the Pecos River Commission. Unable early to make any
computations at all, the Commissions' EAC had struggled to make minor
adjustments in the "1947 condition" baseline and companion
inflow/outflow manual necessary to compute state-line delivery
obligations. Finally, in early 1957, a sub-committee of the EAC submitted
to the EAC proposed findings that would have found New Mexico 129,000
acre-feet behind in Compact deliveries through 1 9 5 5 .1 The Texas member
of the EAC moved the adoption of the findings; New Mexico member

62. See Engineering Advisory Committee Minutes (Oct. 24-25, 1955) in Meetings and
Reports of the Engineering Advisory Committee of the Pecos River Commission, 1950-1958
(minutes from meeting in Albuquerque, N.M., on fie with the Interstate Stream Commission,
Santa Fe, N.M.).
63. See Interview with Carl Slingerland, Engineer, N.M. State Engineer Office, in Santa
Fe, N.M. (May 18,1992). See Em Hall, The Mismeasure of the Pecos River: Royce Tipton and the
1948 Pecos River Compact, 9 W. LEGAL HIST. 55-74 (Winter/Spring 1996).
64. See Steve Reynolds, Hand-written Meeting Notes, Pecos River Commission at Bureau
of Reclamation, Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct. 24-25, 1955) in Correspondence and Data of
Engineering Advisory Committees to Pecos River Commission, 1956-1959 (on file with the
State Engineer Office, Santa Fe, N.M.) Reynolds wanted to re-study base-inflows, salt-cedar
infestation and water salvage.
65. See Plaintiffs Oral Argument, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (Mar. 24,
1980, transcript of Tex. Assistant Att'y Gen. Caroom, at 38-39); Engineering Advisory
Committee Minutes (Apr. 2-3, 1957); Inflow-Outflow Subcommittee of the Engineering
Advisory Committee, Report to the Pecos River Commission Concerning Annual Compact
Determinations, 1947-1955 (Apr. 1, 1957) (on file with the State Engineer Office, Santa Fe,
N.M.).
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Reynolds refused to second the Texas motion." There the matter lay, the
Commission paralyzed completely by its two-vote voting structure and
new-comer Reynolds.
Over the next six years, the Commission got itself back on track
when it adopted in 1962 the Reynolds inspired, Tipton executed Review of
Basic Data re-study of the "1947 condition" base-line study. Using the new
methods, the Commission found that through 1961 there had been 53,300
acre-feet of under-deliveries since 1950, but that New Mexico was
conceivably responsible for only 5,300 acre-feet of those shortages.67 Texas
went along with the new figures that found New Mexico possibly
responsible for five percent (5,300 versus 129,000 acre-feet) of the water that
the engineers figured New Mexico owed over a period that was half as
long (1948-1956 versus 1948-1961).
Instead of freeing the Pecos River Compact commission to move
forward, the 1962 resolution only further stalled it. The Texas engineers
had always blamed Reynolds for the delay and then sharp reduction in
figures. They claimed that Commission cooperation had ended as soon as
brash troublemaker Reynolds had come onto the EAC in 1956. Now,
beginning in 1962, the Texans themselves refused to cooperate. In 1980 the
Supreme Court's Special Master determined that "starting in 1962 Texas
showed a complete lack of desire to agree to anything that New Mexico
wanted."6 '
Texas' general disregard for Commission affairs in the 1960s
played right into Reynolds' hand. In contrast to Reynolds' steadfast
attention to Commission business, Texas chose to make its Pecos River
commissioner a paid, political, minor functionary whose job became a
small, paid plum in Texas politics.7 The Texas commissioner changed
frequently. The job often went to someone collecting a small political debt
with little knowledge of or interest in the Pecos River. New Mexicans loved
to tell the story of the Houston lawyer and minister appointed as Texas
representative to the Pecos River Commission who barely found his way

66. See Engineering Advisory Commission Minutes (Apr. 3,1957) (on file with the State
Engineer Office, Santa Fe, N.M.).
67. See Em Hall, Statement 4(b)-Pecos River Commission Administrative History 18-26,
Texas v. New Mexico, 482 US. 124 (1987) (Aug. 1,1978, on file with the State Engineer Office,
Santa Fe, N.M.).
68. Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to New Mexico's Affirmative Defenses, attached
Memorandum of Texas Consulting Engineer Lowry, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987)
(14 Record at 205, referred to in Bloom, oral argument, Mar. 9,1977).
69. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to New Mexico's Affirmative Defenses, Texas v. New
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (IV Record at 220, testimony of Special Master Jean Breitenstein,
Mar. 9,1977).
70. See Interview with Doug Caroom, Assistant Att'y Gen, Tex., in Austin, Tex. (June 3,
1993).
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to Commission meetings and then only as part of an extended vacation
with his concubine.' True or not, the story showed the little attention with
which Texas viewed the future of the Pecos River Commission.
Instead, under Reynolds' direction the Pecos River Commission
turned to the past. Unable, unwilling and apparently uninterested in
making further findings that might have limited upstream New Mexico's
use of Pecos River water in the name of future Compact compliance, the
Pecos River Commission published in 1961 a 284-page book praising the
progress the Commission had made between 1950 and 1960.' Long, but
not very illuminating, The Pecos River Commission: A Decade of Progress
would seem naive and self-serving in light of the twenty years of bitter
litigation that began in 1974. But from Steve Reynolds' point of view, the
book, which one of his staff members assembled and wrote, must have
looked just fine. After all, it made Pecos River inter-state affairs look
hunky-dory as of 1960 and for the future.
That left Reynolds free to deal with the Pecos River on his own
terms. And deal he did, primarily by insisting that Pecos River users abide
by the important terms of state law as he saw it. Consistent with the Pecos
River Compact's recognition of the inter-relationship of ground and surface
water and with Reynolds' own early victory in the Rio Grande basin,
Reynolds set out in the 1960s to make sure that well owners in the middle
Pecos Valley beneficially used the water to which they were entitled.
By then, farmers, especially in the water-rich Roswell area, had
gotten used to irrigating from their wells in their own way. No court had
ever formally determined the extent of their rights.' Their wells had never
been metered so they were in the habit of pumping as they pleased. In
some Roswell areas artesian pressure was still so good that if well owners
left their wells open, water would just run out all winter, when irrigation
dropped off and the heads came back.' In other Roswell areas, farmers had
increased the acreage that they farmed over the years as they felt like it. All
of these signs that ground water development was running in Roswell by
its own possibly wasteful lights offended Reynolds' understanding that
beneficial use of water was the limit of a water right in New Mexico and
that he, as State Engineer, was in charge of what that limit was.
So in the late 1950s and 1960s he sent his carpet-bag lawyers from
Santa Fe down into Chaves County, where they were not welcome, thank

71. See Interview with J. Lee Cathey, Pecos River Comm'r, Pecos River Comm'n, in
Carlsbad, N.M. (Feb. 19,1993).
72. LUNGLE & LwPORD, THE Pecos Rim ComsiON OF NEw MEXIco AND TEXAS: A
REPORT OF A DECADE OP PROGRESS, 1950-1960 (1961) (Rydal Press, Santa Fe, N.M.).
73. See United States v. Hope Community Ditch, No. 712 (D.C.N.M. Equity 1933).
74. See, e.g. State ex rel. Reynolds v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
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you, to adjudicate ground water rights in the middle Pecos River basin. In
several massive lawsuits that still aren't finished to this day, Reynolds set
out to define for the first time and regulate those water rights. One by one
Roswell farmers were hauled into court and required to prove how much
land they had a right to irrigate and how much water they had a right to
use to do it.7 6
The "conservation" results were spectacular from Reynolds' point
of view. The courts found that 10,000 acres of land in the crucial Acme to
Artesia reach of the basin were being illegally irrigated under New Mexico
state law. The court ordered that those diversions stop. Some other Roswell
wells were so carelessly operated that the court found that they had
forfeited valid underlying rights for so wasting water. For the rest of
Roswell's wells, Reynolds insisted, and the court agreed, that well owners
install meters for the first time and report exactly how much water their
wells had pumped.'
Roswell farmers and their New Mexico Farm Bureau association
groused and groaned. The pointy-headed engineers from Santa Fe, they
said, didn't know anything about irrigation and knew less about farming.
Reynolds didn't care. When some of the farmers went on just as they had
before, Reynolds sent his lawyers into Chaves County, seeking to hold
farmers in criminal contempt for failing to abide by the limits of their
decrees. People, especially from Carlsbad, had always called Roswell
ground water farmers "water bandits." Now Reynolds and the courts were
treating them like thieves.
The Roswell contempt proceedings produced some classic New
Mexico confrontations. When big-time Albuquerque criminal lawyer Billy
Marddondo came to Roswell to defend his in-laws, the Moutreys, against
criminal charges that they had taken more water than their decree allowed,
he ran into Reynolds' chief lawyer, Paul Bloom. In the hearings,
Marchiondo insisted on calling Bloom "Mr. Blum." In frustration, Bloom
started addressing Marchiondo as "Mr. Macaroon." District Judge Paul
Snead, a real expert on water, finally got matters under control. He upheld

75. State ex re. State Engineer v. Lewis, Nos. 20294,22600 (NM 5th Dist. Ct.) (ongoing).
See Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 954 P.2d 763,767 (1998).
76. A whole body of New Mexico water law emerged from these adjudications. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 344 P.2d 943 (N.M 1959); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Massey, 344
P.2d 947 (N.M. 1959); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Fanning, 361 P.2d 721 (N.M. 1961); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Mendenhall, 362 P.2d 998 (N.M. 1961).
77. See McLean, 308 P.2d 983; Kelly v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 379 P.2d 763 (1963). See
also Record at 3642, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 US. 124 (1987) (No. 65) (transcript of May 20,
1986, hearings containing Reynolds' description of "conservation" efforts in the Roswell area).
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the State Engineer's authority and ground water use in Roswell went
down.78
How much was unclear, but it was a lot. Removing 10,000 acres
from irrigation in the 1960s saved at least 30,000 acre-feet a year.
Tightening up controls on valid wells probably saved another 20,000 acrefeet a year. Cast in its most favorable light, Reynolds' successful policy
meant that New Mexicans were taking 50,000 acre-feet a year less from the
Roswell Basin than they had taken in 1947. If Royce Tipton and the
designers of the Pecos River Compact had been right about the connection
of ground water and surface water in the middle reach of the River, then
Reynolds' reduction had to mean more water reached the River. Reynolds'
enforcement of New Mexico's own law incidentally had to make it easier
for New Mexico to meet its inter-state Pecos River compact obligations,
whatever they were."
Priority enforcement, that other great factor in New Mexico water
law, was supposed to have made it easier for New Mexico to comply with
the Compact, too. Everyone suspected that the Carlsbad Irrigation District
(CID) had the oldest rights on the river and that its priority should have
guaranteed it a 100 percent supply s If Carlsbad got all of its supply, then
Texas stood a much better chance of getting its share. Thus, the Pecos River
Compact in article IX guaranteed that if man's activities in New Mexico
produced shortages in Texas, then New Mexico would use priority
enforcement to make it up."1
In the 20 years between 1956 and 1976, State Engineer Steve
Reynolds did everything in his power to make sure that didn't happen. It
wasn't easy, because year after year there wasn't enough water at the
Avalon dam to satisfy the demand of irrigated acres within the Carlsbad
Irrigation District. But Reynolds and his chief lieutenants worked hard with
the officials of the Carlsbad Irrigation District to convince them not to
enforce the senior rights on the river that the district held.

78. See Bloom, supra note 9.
79. See Record at 25-46, Texas v. New Mexico (transcript of Reynolds testimony, May 20-

21,1986).
80. Drafters of the 1948 Pecos River Compact assumed that the Carlsbad Irrigation
District surface rights, which dated from 1893, were older than all of the Roswell ground
water rights, which did not start until some years later. No one was concerned with the
obviously older, antiquated rights of northern New Mexicans who had begun their small
farms around 1803. In later proceedings to set formal priorities in the Lewis adjudication,
Roswell ground water users tried to establish related surface water rights prior even to the
Casrlsbad Irrigation District. At this writing (April 1998) the issue is still pending.
81. See Pecos River Compact art. IX (1948), 1978 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19 (1933). "In
maintaining the flows at the New Mexico-Texas state line required by this compact, New
Mexico shall in all instances apply the principle of prior appropriation within New Mexico."
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According to the district's long-time lawyer, Reynolds told the
district tihe and again that enforcing the district's senior priority wouldn't
work, either physically or legally. Physically, priority enforcement
wouldn't work, according to Reynolds, because shutting down the junior
Roswell wells wouldn't produce anymore water at Carlsbad for a very long
time. And legally, according to Reynolds, priority enforcement wouldn't
work because first he would have to ask the courts to re-adjudicate all the
surface and ground water rights in the whole Pecos River Basin, and that
too would take a very long time. ' Reynolds turned out to be wrong on the
legal grounds.'e Correct as he was as to the matter of hydrologic time,
calling priorities would have worked to bring diversions and stream flow
into a more realistic balance, eventually. But Reynolds had a much quicker
solution than priority enforcement to the chronic problem of Carlsbad
shortages.
Instead of shutting down upstream well owners in Roswell in
order to satisfy the Carlsbad Irrigation District's senior surface water rights,
suggested Reynolds, the CID and its members ought to drill wells of their
own. These wells would produce additional wet water for CID lands much
more quickly and much more reliably than priority enforcement could. The
New Mexico Supreme Court had approved in a Roswell case the use of
what it called a "supplemental well,"" that is a well used to make up in
ground water for what a stream wouldn't yield to a surface water right
holder. CID farmers would drill supplemental wells on their lands and
make up in well water what the Pecos River wouldn't yield.
So during the first fifteen years of Reynolds' tenure as state
engineer, up until 1972, but especially during the early years, CID farmers
82. See Interview with Hon. Jay Forbes in Carlsbad, N.M. (Feb. 18,1993). At the time of
the interview, Judge Forbes had just quit as the CID lawyer. He is now District Judge, Fifth
Judicial District, State of New Mexico.
83. See State ex rel. Reynolds vs. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 663 P.2 358
(1983). This case allowed for expedited priority enforcement in advance of a comprehensive
final decree. Despite the advice that he was giving CID in the two earlier decades, Reynolds
himself argued for expedited priority enforcement and in this case finally won. In mid-1998,
Lea County water users began litigation, not yet resolved as of this June 1998 writing, seeking
to force New Mexico to abide by the priority requirements of the Compact's article IX rather
than using alternative methods for making up state-line shortfalls. See Field v. Interstate
Stream Comm'n, No. CV 98-193 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 19,1998) (5th Judicial Dist., Lea County,
appeal filed).
84. See Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 332 P.2 465, 469 (N.M.
1958). Note that Reynolds as State Engineer opposed the recognition of supplemental ground
water rights in the Roswell basin in Templeton even as he was encouraging them in the CID.
See id. at 470.
85. Reynolds himself quietly put a stop in 1972 to further CID supplemental wells. When
it came time to set the priority of those wells in the Leuis adjudication, Reynolds' lawyers
argued that the priority of the wells should not relate back to the surface water right that the
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filed into the State Engineer's district office in Roswell, and with a showing
of nothing more than a CID certificate indicating that indeed they owned
irrigated land within the district, received a permit to drill a well.' 6 Within
a few years, more than half of the 25,000 irrigable acres within the Carlsbad
Irrigation District were being served by wells that "supplemented" the
ancient, but insufficient, surface water rights on which Carlsbad irrigation
had been founded in the 1890sY7
In later memoranda to the state legislature, Reynolds termed the
supplemental wells "a reasonable alternative to priority enforcement on the
Pecos River. "' Within the CID a whole, weird network of combined
surface and ground water practices built up. In one year one farmer would
combine his surface water right with another farmer's to get enough
surface water for his lands while the other farmer would combine his
supplemental well with the first farmer's and take all of his water from the
ground. The next year the two would switch. So long as the CID water
levels remained high and pumping costs low, use of the supplemental
wells was an easy and efficient way to keep the CID lands at 100 percent
supply without reducing the Roswell wells at all. Everyone seemed to
win."
Except, as Reynolds himself had demonstrated on the Rio Grande,
the Pecos River itself. The supplemental wells made up for what the River
didn't produce, true enough, but they did it by further reducing the water
in the river. (To make matters worse, the CID wells captured water that
wasn't even available at the CID surface water points of diversion at the
Avalon Dam. ) On the Rio Grande, Reynolds had slowed down ground
water development "to keep," as the lawyers and hydrologists were fond
of saying, "the river whole." On the Pecos, Reynolds speeded up ground
water development in order to keep surface water users fully supplied for
as long as possible. Ifthe Rio Grande policy kept the Rio Grande whole, the

ground water supplemented, but, instead, should date from the well drilling. Reynolds won.
See State ex rel. State Engineer v. Lewis, Nos. 20294,22600 (N.M. 5th Dist. Ct.) (ongoing).

86. See Interview with "Pinky" Galloway, Consulting Geologist and ex-State Engineer
Office Water Rights Engineer, in Roswell, N.M.(Dec. 17,1992). Reynolds ceased the practice,
quietly and administratively, in 1972.
87. See Zane Spiegel, Ground Water Trends in New Mexico, X N.M. PROF. ENGINEER (Apr.

1958).
88. See Steve Reynolds, Memorandum on Pecos River System Administration (Jul. 12,
1976), Reynolds Papers, supra note 42. (Item No. 143, on file at Interstate Stream Commission,

Santa Fe, N.M.).
89. See Galloway, supra note 86; Forbes, supranote 83.
90. In this sense, the CID wells took the return flows from CID irrigation otherwise
bound for Texas and always a part of Texas's calculation as water that it would receive under
the Pecos River Compact's apportionment. Compare the unregulated ground water
development below Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande.
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Pecos policy had to further dismantle a river already subject to the prior
claims of the Carlsbad Irrigation District under New Mexico state law and
to the superior claims of Texas under inter-state compact law.
The policy worked so long as the CID and Texas did not assert
their basic rights. Through the 1950s and 1960s neither had. And then, in
the 1970s, the loose understandings and administrative compromises and
indifference that had held Carlsbad and Texas in check began to come
unglued.
The appointment of West Texas lawyer RB. Magowan as Texas
commissioner to the Pecos River Commission in the 1970s started the
trouble. Magowan was a colorful, outspoken advocate for lower Pecos
River irrigators in Texas. He had gained fame prosecuting West Texas' own
Billy Sol Estes and had made a lot of money investing in movies like "Texas
Chain Saw Massacre." Magowan was not inclined, to say the least, to
follow the lead of Steve Reynolds on the Commission, as the previous
Texas commissioners had. Magowan pointed out that year after year less
and less water had crossed the New Mexico-Texas state line. He balked at
Reynolds' insistence that the Commission come up with an accurate
measure of the River performance before it tried to determine whether or
not New Mexico had depleted the flow of the river below the 1947
condition. R.B. Magowan finally went back to the original inflow-outflow
curves set out in Royce Tipton's initial Pecos River studies for the compact.
When he did, R.B. Magowan discovered that in the 25 years of the
Compact, New Mexico had chronically under-delivered Pecos River water
to Texas. Using the original Pecos River computations, Magowan
compared how much the River should have produced with how much
actually had arrived at the state line in the years since the 1948 Compact.
It took Texas more than fifteen years to get around to that computation. But
when it did, it discovered that over the life of the Compact, the original
Tipton curves showed that New Mexico had under-delivered more than
1,400,000 acre-feet to Texas. 91
That was enough to start R.B. Magowan fuming at the Pecos River
Commission meetings. While Steve Reynolds muttered about refining the
description of the River, Magowan insisted more and more stridently that
New Mexico meet its initial obligation. Finally, at the 1974 Annual Meeting
of the Pecos River Commission, Magowan rose, recanted all the work the
Commission had previously done and demanded that New Mexico deliver
to Texas the 1,400,000 acre-feet that it owed. If New Mexico did not, said

91. See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Complaint and Proposed Complaint, Texas v.
New Mexico, 482 US. 124 (1987) (No. 65) (Motion filed June 26, 1974. On file with State
Engineer Office, Santa Fe, N.M., SEO 2255GD2.).
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Magowan, Texas would sue. "Fine," said Steve Reynolds. "Let the interstate battle begin."92
In the meantime, as relations between Reynolds and Magowan and
New Mexico and Texas deteriorated, the Carlsbad Irrigation District fell out
of line. The rising costs of natural gas started real trouble in the 1960s and
1970s at Carlsbad. The gas powered the CID supplemental wells. As the
ground water became more expensive, the Pecos River surface water
started to look better to CID irrigators. Less willing to use increasingly
expensive well water, CID irrigators began to talk more and more of their
prior right to Pecos River surface water. State Engineer Reynolds and Carl
Slingerland found it more and more difficult to convince the CID board to
forego its legal right to surface water in favor of the wet water that the
supplemental wells offered."
Finally, in early 1976, the matter came to a head. CID attorney Jay
Forbes drafted a short letter to Reynolds, demanding what everyone had
feared for 25 years. CID demanded that the State Engineer do what the
State Constitution and law required: enforce Pecos River priorities and shut
down junior well appropriators in Roswell so senior surface appropriators
in Carlsbad would get 100 percent of their supply from the River."
The separate Texas and Carlsbad moves threatened the heart of
Steve Reynolds' water regime. R.B. Magowan's suit would mean that
Reynolds could no longer hold the Texans at bay while New Mexico
worked out its own internal Pecos River problems. Carlsbad's priority call
on the River would mean a loss of Reynolds' administrative control over
River resources to the courts, which would enforce the priorities and, even
worse, resort to the unsophisticated tool of priority to control access to
water. On both scores, Reynolds was in trouble.
He responded, as always, by working harder. By the mid-1970s
Steve Reynolds focused more and more of his prodigious energy on the
problems of the Pecos River. Reynolds' chief legal lieutenant estimated that
by the mid-1980s Reynolds was spending 80 percent of his time on the
Texas-New Mexico struggle over the river' and that was 80 percent of a lot
of time.
But, at least at the outset, Reynolds was playing on a field that he
liked: the courts. And he was playing according to a strategy that suited
him: his own. In the end, the strategy turned on him and the court turned
out to be less friendly to his positions than he thought it would.

92. Hall, supranote 67.
93. See Galloway, supranote 86; Forbes, supra note 82.
94. See Forbes, supra note 82; Steve Reynolds, Memorandum on Pecos River
Administration (July 12,1976).
95. See Simms, supranote 34.
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Increasingly isolated late in the litigation, Reynolds watched while the
water world that he had so carefully constructed on the Pecos River came
crashing down around him.
Elsewhere on the New Mexico waterscape, the world changed even
as Reynolds struggled to steady it. In the last decade of his life, between
1980 and 1990, he was not sufficiently flexible to accommodate the new
values that were emerging in a changing New Mexico." More than one of
his long-time fans lamented that his long, rich career continued for ten
years beyond its time.' The problem was, as it always is, that the future
receded before him even as he tried to grasp it. In the end, what he had
striven for his entire professional career was behind him when his life
finally ended. In the previous 25 years, between 1955 and 1980, Steve
Reynolds had demonstrated the constant underlying vision and the
sinuous leadership necessary to move New Mexico into what he saw as its
future, a future that became its past before it ever arrived.

96. See, e.g., Gerald D. Nash, New Mexico since 190. An Overview, in CoNT eoRARY NEW
MExico, 1940-1990, at 1 (Richard W.Etulain, ed., 1994) (describing the varied influences,
including wars, science, technology, and tourism, that have changed the face of New Mexico).
97. See Bloom, supra note 9; Simms, supra note 34.

